Abstract: Virtues, according to Michael Slote, are our inner traits or dispositions. Slote defends "balanced caring" as an admirable character trait. He believes that caring more for intimates than others is admirable. A virtuous person attains balanced caring between intimates and others. This account of virtue conceived "balanced caring" as "fundamentally admirable" and it is the basic virtue. All other virtues, such as honesty, kindness, generosity, truthfulness, and so forth, are "derivatively admirable". This paper examines Slote's view and argues that Slote should explore the opposite situation because his idea of "balanced caring" and "admirability" is so vague and misleading. In contrast to his ideas, a reverse formulation that is caring for others more than for intimates seems plausible.
Introduction
Recent virtue ethicists have devoted themselves to exploring a plausible account of virtue that is not only morally significant but also action-guiding. Michael Slote, one of the leading figures in contemporary virtue ethics, has developed an agent-based virtue ethics. According to Slote, "balanced caring" is "fundamentally admirable" and it is the only virtue. He distinguishes between two classes of people in this world: one class comprises intimates such as our parents, children, friends, spouses, and loved ones; and the other class comprises all other people, generally referred to as strangers. Slote defends caring for intimates as being something admirable. A caring person would thus accommodate a balanced caring between these two classes. However, his idea of "balanced caring" and "admirability" is very misleading. In contrast to Slote, I believe that the notion of "balance" and the classification of human beings is inappropriate to formulating a credible virtue ethical account.
Therefore, my goal is to examine the plausibility of the Slotean account of virtue, and to show rather that a reverse formulation of the Slotean account is plausible. Some major objections to Slote's virtue ethics have already been provided by David Copp and David Sobel in their article "Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics". Copp and Sobel rightly suggested that caring for strangers is "much more admirable" than caring for intimates (Copp, Sobel 2004, 520) . I will take up Copp and Sobel's suggestion in outlining a reverse formulation of Slote's view. In section one of this paper, I will present some vital features of the Slotean account of virtue. In sections two and three respectively, I will argue that Slote should consider the opposite, and that a reverse formulation of the Slotean account of virtue is plausible. Finally, the issue of supererogation will be addressed in section four.
Slote's Account of Virtue
Slote's virtue ethics is a great turning point in the history of virtue thinking because it develops a non-Aristotelian approach to virtue ethics and reshapes the feminist idea of care ethics. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle was more concerned about the character of the individuals rather than their motives, or actions. Aristotle believed that the virtuous person would always perform virtuous acts through her wisdom. Slote calls this view "agentfocused". In contrast, an "agent-based" virtue ethics would consider the agent's actions or motives of the virtuous act. It attempts to deal with aretaic "ethical characterizations of motives, character traits, or individuals" (Slote 2003, 203 ). An agent-based virtue ethics "must derive its evaluations of human actions" (Baron, Pettit, and Slote 1997, 206) . So, unlike Aristotle, Slote formulates an agent-based virtue ethics, and this is one of the main distinctive features in his virtue ethics.
An agent-based virtue ethics emphasizes virtuous motives. Slote distinguishes between "aretaic" and "deontic" virtuous motives or dispositions. He argues that aretaic notions, such as good, excellent are primary to virtue ethics. By contrast, deontic notions, such as right, obligation are derivative. Slote claims that deontic notions can be derived from aretaic notions. In his words, "I hope to be able to show you how deontic concepts can be derived from aretaic ones" (Slote 1992, xiv) . The fundamental aretaic concept according to Slote is "admirability", which is neutral and capable of deriving deontic concepts. He writes, "The virtue ethics I will be developing will... favor "neutral" aretaic concepts like admirability and (a) virtue" (ibid., xvi). In this sense, Slote distinguishes his aretaic account of virtue from other virtue theorists, such as, Plato, Aristotle, Sidgwick and Hursthouse.
Finally and most importantly, in his virtue ethics Slote defends only one virtue, balanced caring. Needless to say, before Slote, feminist ethicists, such as Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Martin L. Hoffman developed care approaches in their writings but none of them consider care as a virtue nor do they consider its action-guidingness or the notion of "balance". Moreover, it seems that their ethics of care mainly focuses on responsibility, autonomy, justice, fairness, equality, and rights. For example, Gilligan says, "Since everyone is vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment, two moral visions-one of justice and one of care-recur in human experience" (Gilligan 2003, 230) . Her concept of responsibility establishes a new conception of the interrelation between the self and others (Arnett and Arneson 1999, 163) . Nevertheless, these views have a profound influence on Slote. According to Slote, balanced caring is a "fundamentally admirable" character trait. A virtuous person would balance caring between her intimates and all other human beings.
He says, "The view I want to propose emphasizes balance as between intimate caring (our concern for near and dear) and humanitarian caring (our concern for people in general)" (Slote 2001, 66) . Caring is a basic form of moral excellence and Slote believes that it is morally good to care more for intimates than other people. In fact, caring more for intimates is a moral requirement for virtuous people. He writes, "One can and should care more about some friends or relations than about others" (ibid., 66).
Obviously, Slote's structure of caring raises many questions. It seems to me that Slote creates a circle around us and our intimates to exclude other human beings. However, virtue seems to be something that goes beyond this circle, to feel the suffering of people that promotes welfare for intimates as well as for other human beings. Not only that, his further comment seems more controversial. He says, "a morally good or decent individual will sometimes, indeed often, be doing things for those she loves or cares most about, when she could be doing more good for humanity as a whole" (Slote 2001, 72) .
Slote Should Consider the Opposite
Three noticeable problems in Slote's account are: firstly, that the idea of "balanced" and "admiring" is vague; secondly, deontic assessment cannot always be derived from aretaic assessment; and finally, there is a problem with classification. I will discuss these problems and argue that Slote should consider exploring the opposite.
Firstly, at the heart of the Slotean account of virtue, there are two misleading concepts: "intuition" and "balance". Slote says that a virtuous person needs to balance her caring between two categories, intimates and strangers. But how is she able to do this? What is the basis of such a balance? Slote does not provide us with a reasonable answer except that of trusting our own intuitions on the "right and wrong action to direct...balanced concern" (Copp, Sobel 2004, 519 ). Copp and Sobel consider this intuition to be part of the methodology which allows him to construct the basis of his theory. But I believe that even their attempt is also challenging and possibly unacceptable. A plausible virtue theory must explain its basic principles and it may not depend on mere common-sense intuitive plausibility even for the sake of its further construction.
The argument is that such a methodology could result in the unreliability of a theory and devalue its action-guidingness. These two criteria-reliability and actionguidingness-seem to be crucial to a virtue ethical theory. For example, if someone believes that honesty is a fundamental virtue then she should say what honesty means to her and how we can achieve it. She may not claim that we all have intuition on what honesty is and then construct her virtue theory. Rather she should clearly state what honesty means to her, for instance, is honesty telling the truth? Or is it giving an unbiased judgment? And so forth. Slote explores his theory by grounding it in a preconceived perspective on intuition. Slote's concern for intuition becomes more complex once we turn our attention to Copp and Sobel's points.
They correctly noticed that beyond these two categories there is another category which is the virtuous person "herself". So, Slote has missed the third category. Now, how can the virtuous person's intuitions help her to create a balance between these three categories: the intimates, the strangers, and the virtuous person herself? (ibid., 523).
In addition, there is a crucial point that Copp and Sobel have not mentioned. Slote considers intimates and strangers equally by saying that "...our ordinary thinking about the virtuous treats the category of the trait possessor and the category of "other people" (i.e. people other than the trait possessor) as of roughly equal importance" (Slote 1992, 98) . Some problems arise here: firstly, Slote is giving equal importance to both categories but arguing that one category, namely, the intimates, is more favorable and considerable. This attempt seems to be inconsistent. Secondly, within the three categories it may not be possible to come up with an "equal" balanced caring because at least one group has to sacrifice something. Then a new question arises: who should get least priority-the virtuous person herself, the intimates, or the strangers? Finally, on what principle should the virtuous person convey "roughly equal importance" to all categories, but favor the intimates, and claim that her character traits are admirable? Intuitions in Slote's theory, therefore, do not reasonably enable us to figure out which are admirable character traits.
Secondly, as stated previously, the Slotean account is primarily aretaic. It claims that the deontic assessment can be derived from the aretaic assessment. He also stated that admirability is the fundamental aretaic notion and that it is neutral. What is the admirable character trait then? According to Slote, the character trait which admires balanced caring is the admirable character trait.
The complexity in this aretaic to deontic derivation is that we do not know with certainty which character a person has, whether she is an intimate or a stranger. We can only judge whether she is performing immoral acts. Let us take the example of killing as mentioned by Copp and Sobel. Suppose a man kills a maximum of three strangers to save his child but he would not kill three strangers to save his friend. He considered this to be balanced concern. Now, the problem is whether this balanced concern is as admirable as that which would lead him to kill only one stranger to save his child but he would kill no-one to save his friend (Copp, Sobel 2004, 520) . Can we derive the deontic assessment of this act from the aretaic assessment of his states of character? The opposite is more acceptable i.e. from the deontic assessment of killing to the aretaic assessment of killer's character traits. It is also not so clear whether admirability is a "neutral" concept because if we admire balanced caring it seems that balanced caring is a positive notion.
Finally, in Slote's theory the definitions regarding what "balanced" concern is and what amount is required to denote balance are very misleading. Moreover, dividing people into two classes is hardly acceptable in a plausible virtue ethical account. A truly virtuous person would not distinguish between intimates and more distant acquaintances in caring. Copp and Sobel do not seem to agree with this claim. Although they argue that "it is much more admirable to care for strangers than to care for intimates such as our children and friends" they do not reject this classification either (ibid., 520). However, even caring for strangers is better. This type of classification (intimates and strangers) among human beings seems unacceptable to the virtuous person. An example will clarify my point.
Imagine that Mr. X is a virtuous person who has two children and they are identical twins. Suppose that one morning, one of his children is playing with another child whose parents Mr. X does not know at all well. Suddenly these children fall into the swimming pool. Mr. X does not know how to swim, and he has only one hand as his other hand was removed last year as a consequence of infection. Moreover, nobody is present who could help Mr. X to save both children. So, Mr. X can save only one child by extending his hand to either one of the two children-is own or the other. To whom should he give his hand?
According to Slote, Mr. X should give his hand to his own child and save him without any hesitation. As he is a virtuous person, Mr. X should care for intimates rather than for strangers. One could point out that Slote's theory is applicable only when "others" is taken as "in sensu composito" i.e. as a class or category rather than "in sensu diviso" i.e. as "each and every other individual" (Slote 1992, 98) . But in our case we could easily consider Mr. X's children as a class and someone's child as another class rather than merely as individuals.
According to Copp and Sobel, Mr. X as a virtuous person should give his hand to the other child rather than his own child because caring more for strangers than for intimates is a much more admirable trait. A supporting reason is that his own children are twins and to sacrifice one of them would not be a great loss.
I believe that both acts would lie in contradiction to virtuousness to some extent. Mr. X cannot willingly let his own child die to save someone's child though that is relatively better from the virtue ethical point of view. Similarly, he cannot save his own child and let someone else's child die. Even though he has twins the emotional attachment and feelings for them are very different. The truly virtuous person, then, would not make a distinction between intimates and strangers. She should not draw a boundary line between the two categories. She should be motivated virtuously to save both the children though only one can be saved. She should not know whether her own or someone else's child is going to be saved. Her endeavor to save both children is virtuous and morally significant.
A further limitation of Slote's classification is that it does not tell us how the right balance of caring is achievable within the intimate class. For example, what is the right balance of caring between our intimates-parents, children, spouse, brother, sister, friends, and loved ones? Suppose in the previous example, the other child were Mr. X's youngest brother, then who should be saved-his own child or his brother? So, Slote's classification creates a central problem for the plausibility of his virtue ethical theory.
A Reverse Formulation of Slote's Account of Virtue
Copp and Sobel have stated that "Slote takes the virtues to be admirable sates of character. Unfortunately, he provides no substantive criteria of admirability" (Copp, Sobel 2004, 543) . They also believe that Slote's account significantly neglects others' welfare which may give us a "bad character". So, our primary goal in this part is to provide a satisfactory criterion of admirability which also considers others' welfare.
The formulation that I am intending to explore here is roughly that admirable character traits will be defined according to the idea that "closer to heart is less favorable and less close to heart is more favorable". Unlike Slote, this formulation necessarily omits classifying human beings as intimates or strangers. However, if we frame it in Slote's language then we could say that the more intimate they are to us, the less favorable and the less intimate to us, the more favorable. Or, alternatively, the more distant they are to us, the more favorable and the less distant they are to us, the less favorable. This is clearly in opposition to Slote's account. We may call it "a reverse formulation".
How can we measure proximity to our heart? What is the underlying principle? Presumably, we could say that the closest person to someone's heart is herself, followed by her family members, friends, strangers, and the environment (animals, plants and matter), respectively. So, at the top level of the closeness scale is the person itself while at the bottom level is the environment surrounding that person.
Consider the following two cases: • Case 1-Mr. Y cares for his children the most and spends the maximum amount of money on their welfare.
• Case 2-Mr. X cares for all the children in this world irrespective of their race, religion, nationality, and spends the maximum amount of money on their welfare without knowing who is getting the money. Which character trait is more admirable? Caring for one's own children or caring for all children without expecting anything in return?
Surely, case 2 displays more admirable character traits. We do not need here the Slotean vague "intuition" or his confusing notion of "balance". Our guiding principle "closer to the heart is less favorable and less close to the heart is more favorable" is sufficient to achieving admirable character traits. Our own children belong to the second level on our closeness scale, while all children belong to the fourth level. Therefore, to have an admirable character trait we should favor all children more and our own children less.
One possible limitation of the reverse account could be that the closeness scale may not be the same for all. That is, one person may say that her friend is closer than her family members. Or, she may say that her pet is closer to her heart than her friend. I agree that such closeness is possible. However, that would be rare and exceptional. The regular closeness scale should be the one proposed. In fact, if we favor someone who is our intimate that character trait does not exhibit any virtuous motives or dispositions. All self-centered people would have these character traits. Only the virtuous person will consider that caring more for strangers is moral and that it is a moral excellence.
Slote's classification of the two categories is based on social relationship and kinship bonding. For example, we have a kinship relation with our brother and sister, while with strangers we have no kinship relation but may or may not have a social relation. By contrast, the reverse formulation omits such a social or kinship relation. For instance, we do not have any sort of social or kinship relation with the environment though we should be caring for it.
It is justifiable to say that when a person favors someone without expecting any "thanks", "rewards", or any sort of "return", that character trait is much more admirable and virtuous. Slote's account completely ignores this sentiment. But as I mentioned earlier, Slote's account is important for exploring "care" as a virtuous character trait. He also holds that "A caring person might thus see the promotion of caring as the best way to promote what she as a caring person is concerned about" (Slote 2003, 219) .
The reverse rather than the Slotean account is compatible with this view. A caring person should promote caring in the way in which she is concerned with it. In the reverse account, the caring person is not only caring for those who are closer to heart but also for those who are less close to heart. In fact, the latter is more favorable to her. Thus, according to our closeness scale, favoring the environment rather than favoring one's own self is a virtuous character trait. Eventually, this account could contribute significantly to the broader moral perspective, such as the human-nature relationship.
Virtue, Empathy, and Supererogation
In his recent book The Ethics of Care and Empathy, Slote has significantly developed his view to accommodate the issue of supererogation. For instance, instead of "balanced caring" he explores the idea of "empathic caring" which successfully rectifies some of the major criticisms mentioned earlier, and also incorporates some sort of obligation to help others. Supererogatory is an idea which generally suggests that doing something for distant people is praiseworthy, but it is neither a moral requirement nor the duty of agents. Kawall mentions, "A supererogatory action is often described as one that (in some sense) goes beyond duty or what is morally required" (Kawall 2009, 180) . However, this is not the only sense of supererogation. Blum identifies three different senses of supererogation and one of them is "having greater merit". He writes, "Supererogatory" can mean different things. If supererogatory is taken to imply "having greater merit," then those who exemplify care would have greater merit than those who merely fulfilled obligations" (Blum 1993, 62-63) . So, the important questions are: Is caring more for distant people than intimates supererogatory? If it is, then should the acts of virtuous people, such as Mother Teresa, inspire us as virtues or duties?
Slote deals with the first question by referring to Peter Singer who believes that we have an equal obligation to help unknown children just as we should help those we know. This type of empathy is necessarily supererogatory according to Slote. He says, "the person who demonstrates more empathy than most people with fully developed empathy ever show can be said to act in a supererogatory fashion" (Slote 2007, 34) . Notice that Slote introduces here the term "fully developed empathy", and he argues that ordinary people who are naturally self-interested or self-centred are not fully developed empathetic human beings. Indeed, he rejects the claim that we have equal obligations to those people who are unknown to us.
To answer the second question, we may consider other virtue ethicists' criterion of rightness. In an influential book On Virtue Ethics, Hursthouse writes, "An action is right if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances" (Hursthouse 1999, 28) . On the other hand, Slote's criterion is that, "actions are morally wrong and contrary to moral obligation if, and only if, they reflect or exhibit or express an absence (or lack) of fully developed empathic concern" (Slote 2007, 31) .
Thus, if we follow Hursthouse's criterion we have a duty to help distant people because virtuous agents like Mother Teresa helped distant people more than their intimates. If we fail to follow this, that would be a violation of duty and hence morally wrong. Our reverse formulation is very much compatible with this norm. But it may not be rare that virtuous people sometimes do make mistakes. Slote, however, thinks such types of action (i.e. helping others) should be morally praiseworthy, though not virtuous. He states, "we would intuitively regard such a person as having acted supererogatorily, as having in a most praiseworthy way gone beyond the call of duty" (Slote 2007, 34) . So, Slote's view here is much more moderate in comparison to that in his previous work.
Slote believes that his concept of empathy is superior to ideas held by other care ethicists on caring about people who are not intimates. Noddings argues, "I am not obliged to care for starving children in Africa, because there is no way for this caring to be completed" (Noddings 2003, 249) . However, Slote would say that if we are fully developed empathetic beings then we have an obligation to care for them. Noddings outlines her approach as a "feminine ethic" which "begins to look a bit mean in contrast to the masculine ethics" (ibid., 252). Similarly, Gilligan's ground-breaking work In a Different Voice suggests that "men and women may speak different languages that they assume are the same" (Tong 1993, 81) .
Nonetheless, these two opposing kinds of morality, masculine and feminine, are according to Slote "one-sided and need to be complemented or supplemented" (Slote 2004, 293) . He proposes that "a virtue ethics of caring" should be reconstructed as "a virtue ethics of empathic caring". Since the term empathy has "remarkable explanatory power" in normative ethics, the superiority of emphatic caring is that, unlike care ethics, it can explain a "wider range of moral distinctions" (ibid., 296-298). Nevertheless, Slote still needs to explain why we should be partial to showing our empathy towards distant people.
Conclusion
The Slotean account of virtue raises many challenging issues for virtue ethics. Slote's most unsatisfactory and vague conception is "balanced caring". Moreover, he relies largely on intuition to achieve "balance", and there is no plausible guideline as to how we can achieve it except by relying on our intuition. Copp and Sobel indicated that caring for strangers is more virtuous than caring for intimates. I find their indication reasonable and argued that a plausible virtue ethical account should take the opposite direction to that adopted by Slote. Contrary to Slote, the reverse formulation "closer to heart is less favorable and less close to heart is more favorable" is plausible because it rejects classification and no balance or intuition is required. Moreover, it can provide us with a significant guideline to help us deal with our relationship to the broader moral circle. Although Slote's recent position is much more moderate and somehow accommodates the issue of supererogation, Slote still needs to explore the idea of partial empathy.
